Naval War College Review
Volume 57
Number 1 Winter

Article 28

2004

Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts,
Jon Czarnecki

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Czarnecki, Jon (2004) "Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts,," Naval War College Review: Vol. 57 : No. 1 , Article 28.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/28

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Czarnecki: Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts,

teen in 1993.) The National Defense College was closed, officers were required to
get college degrees, the content of their
education was greatly expanded, and the
publication of a new college journal was
ordered. Haycock’s essay on the changes
and their potential should be required
reading as Canada endeavors to find its
way out of the “colonial cringe” through
emphasized tactics and technology.
In his overview of current European
military education, Peter Foot describes
three types that exist today: “Jena”
schools, which look to professional,
in-house education; “Falkland” schools,
which “bolt on” new material; and
“Kosovo” schools, which address complexity and ambiguity and seek external, civilian accreditation. Foot notes a
trend toward commonality, including
more joint and combined training and
advanced distance learning. He gives
particular attention to military training
in Eastern Europe, noting in particular
developments in Bulgaria and in the
Baltic republics’ tristate institution.
In all, this is a collection worth reading, especially to remind us of the impediments to change and the perpetual
tension between training and education (within its critical thinking), between tradition and innovation, and
between technology and strategy. The
debate over military education began
as early as Plato, and it will not end
with Kennedy or Neilson.
JUDITH STIEHM

Florida International University
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There are so many books about the
Vietnam War and the Vietnam experience that the message of one more risks
being lost amidst a vast ocean of tragic
tales told with great pain. However,
Hackworth and England have provided
something more than a reminiscence of
an Army combat unit in the post–Tet
Offensive world of Vietnam; they have
presented readers with a tactical reform
primer for infantry. All the information
is there in stark GI English, beginning
with the first sentence of chapter 1 (not
repeated here out of delicacy), and finishing up with the last sentences of the
last chapter: “We now need to fight
smart as much as we need to get even.
There is no other choice. We do it right
or we lose. We win—or we die.”
Hackworth and England are referring
to the new war against terrorism in the
post-9/11 world. The quotation applies
to the current day, and it applied to
Hackworth’s nightmare battalion in the
Mekong Delta in 1969.
His unit was the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The troops making up the
battalion were, as the authors state, citizen draftee soldiers, not the volunteers
that had filled the first combat units
that went into Vietnam back in 1965.
These soldiers did not want to be in
Vietnam. They had come from a country where protests against the war had
become large-scale performance art,
widely publicized by news media and,
most importantly, were supported by a
large portion of the population. These
reluctant warriors were doubly cursed,
for they were part of an army the leadership of which had started to unravel
in the face of the stubborn refusal of an
enemy to admit defeat, an enemy who
still could attack U.S. soldiers with skill,
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speed, and lethality. Hackworth and
England are unsparing in their depictions of the martinets and incompetents
who made up a fair portion of the officer and noncommissioned officers’
corps that led soldiers into the Delta
swamps and rice paddies—beginning
with the battalion commander who
places his unit’s main base in the middle of a Viet Cong minefield, through a
commanding general more focused on
maximizing body counts for his own
career than on effectively fighting an
elusive enemy.
Despite determined opposition both
from the enemy and higher headquarters, Hackworth achieved an organizational transformation of his hard-luck
battalion. The 4/39th became a skilled,
deadly foe of the Viet Cong in the
Delta, a unit that took the fight to the
enemy, taking away his initiative.
Hackworth did this through reimposition of a strict but fair discipline, introduction of and training in proven and
successful fieldcraft, and leadership
from the front. There are no magic bullets or technological fixes for this kind
of transformation, just simple success
on the battlefield—the enemy dies or
goes away. In the beginning of his command, Hackworth’s disciplinarian approach earned him a contract on his
head from his own soldiers. By the time
he left, one of these same soldiers
would write, “The most terrible thing
happened today. Colonel Hackworth
left. You remember the one everyone
hated, and wanted shot? Now there’s
another bounty out for him—to anyone
who can get him back.”
Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts contains the
collected practical wisdom of this successful battalion commander. Curiously, however, the wisdom that keeps
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soldiers alive on the battlefield does not
necessarily contribute to the end of battles or wars. Hackworth and England
acknowledge as much in an account of
a conversation between Hackworth and
John Paul Vann. Hackworth and Vann
were compatriots and friends; Vann
had been Hackworth’s company commander in Korea. Vann, now a civilian
advisor to the South Vietnamese regime, told Hackworth that while his
battalion was improving the security of
the area, they were killing too many civilians. Vann added, “Once the 9th’s
out of here, I reckon that eighty to
ninety percent of the Delta’s population
will come to our side. You guys have
been the VC’s biggest recruiter. You kill
a boy’s mama, which side do you
reckon he’ll join?”
Therein lies the major lesson of this
frank, valuable book. A nation’s armed
forces can be exceptionally well trained,
exceptionally lethal, and full of esprit de
corps. They can win all the battles. They
can maximize the body count. But if the
end of the battle or war is flawed—or
worse, uncertain—no amount of courage, steel, or personal battlefield leadership will have obtained victory.
JON CZARNECKI

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the
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That the United States has conducted a
program of high-altitude and spaceborne photographic reconnaissance
since the mid-1950s is hardly a secret.

2

